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Faced with an epidemic of an infectious disease, per-
sons may take precautionary actions to try to reduce their 
risk. Such actions include avoiding situations that persons 
perceive to be risky, which can have negative health and 
economic effects. Therefore, we conducted a population-
based survey of persons’ precautionary actions in response 
to a hypothetical infl uenza pandemic. For the 5 European 
and 3 Asian regions that had been affected by severe acute 
respiratory syndrome, the pattern of reported precautionary 
action was broadly similar across the regions; ≈75% of re-
spondents reported that they would avoid public transporta-
tion and 20%–30% would try to stay indoors. Some regional 
differences were noted; Europeans were more likely than 
Asians to avoid places of entertainment, and Asians were 
more likely to avoid seeing physicians. This international 
survey provides insight into what might be expected during 
an infl uenza pandemic.
The risk of acquiring an infectious disease may stimu-late persons to take precautionary actions to try to re-
duce this risk as they perceive it. The potential effect of this 
perceived risk–induced behavior was apparent during the 
outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 
2003. For example, use of public transportation in affected 
areas and international fl ights to these areas were reduced 
dramatically (1,2). Precautionary actions, such as avoiding 
public transportation or avoiding situations in which per-
sons congregate, may have potential epidemiologic effects 
and would be expected to have economic consequences. 
The demand for certain goods and services may decline, 
and output may be reduced if persons avoid work or social 
interactions and associated purchase of goods. The eco-
nomic effect of such precautionary actions may be substan-
tial. For instance, the economic effect of SARS has been 
estimated at US $30–$100 billion (3–5), although the out-
break was confi ned to a few months and <10,000 persons 
were infected. Macroeconomic estimates suggest that the 
indirect general demand–reducing effect of SARS in non-
health sectors was greater than the direct health effect and 
associated productivity losses to SARS patients and their 
families (6).
The nature and scale of this economic shock have 
caused concerns that pandemic infl uenza could have a 
catastrophic effect on the global economy. Understanding 
the factors that lead persons to take preventive actions to 
avoid infection may help forecast the possible course of an 
epidemic and its economic effect. This information would 
help decision-makers give appropriate advice to limit indi-
vidual, community health, and economic effects.
The spread of highly pathogenic avian infl uenza 
(H5N1) and the documented illness and deaths of >300 
persons in >12 countries (7) has heightened concerns that 
an infl uenza pandemic may be imminent. The effect of 
efforts to limit the dramatic health and economic conse-
quences of such a pandemic will depend on how persons 
react. Research on public reaction to previous outbreaks 
has shown that persons may take misjudged precautionary 
actions (e.g., avoid places and activities that bear low risk 
for infection, avoid healthcare facilities for fear of infec-
tion, refuse to comply with quarantine efforts) that may 
contribute to the pandemic’s adverse economic effect (8). 
Therefore, to improve communication efforts by health of-
fi cials, to enable pandemic containment, and to avoid un-
warranted losses to the economy, knowledge of how per-
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sons will respond to the threat of an outbreak is crucial (6). 
However, research in this area is lacking (9). To overcome 
this gap, we conducted a population-based survey in 8 re-
gions (5 European countries and 3 east Asian regions) to 
estimate whether persons might take precautionary actions 
during an infl uenza pandemic, the extent of such behavior, 
and factors that might infl uence it.
According to most models of health behavior, percep-
tion of being at risk is a prerequisite for behavior change, a 
supposition supported by empirical studies (10,11). These 
models endorse the belief that a high perceived risk of 
harm encourages persons to take action to reduce their risk. 
However, the direction of the association between risk per-
ception and behavior in empirical studies varies positively, 
negatively, or not at all (11,12). The empirical literature 
that links risk perception and health behavior is subject to 
some debate about methods (6,13). First, the relationship 
between risk perception and preventive actions may be si-
multaneous, which makes it diffi cult to determine causality 
from observed behavior in cross-sectional data. Second, at 
least 2 broad methods exist for analyzing the role of risk in 
social science, and the choice of method is important. The 
most common approach is the realist approach, in which 
risk is seen as an objective threat or danger that can be 
measured independent of the social context within which 
it occurs (6,13). The alternative is the social constructionist 
approach, which describes risk as being based on objective 
facts about danger and hazard, amenable to rationalistic 
calculations, which are then mediated, perceived, and re-
sponded to in particular ways through social, cultural, and 
political processes (13). We used the social constructionist 
approach, in which individual and societal level factors can 
affect the relationship between risk perception and health 
behavior.
Our study sample was drawn from 2 sources: Asian 
regions in which SARS cases were reported and European 
countries in which no SARS cases occurred. Both catego-
ries could incur a new SARS or pandemic infl uenza out-
break. These categories are useful for determining whether 
previous exposure to a similar type of hazard has had any 
effect on risk perceptions and associated precautionary ac-
tions.
Methods
As a part of a survey of risk perception, knowledge, 
and sources of information for SARS and infl uenza, we 
conducted a study on precautionary actions for a hypotheti-
cal infl uenza pandemic in 5 European countries (Denmark, 
Spain, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Poland), and 3 
Asian regions (Guangdong [People’s Republic of China], 
Hong Kong [Special Administrative Region, People’s Re-
public of China], and Singapore) that had been affected by 
SARS. The overall survey, from which risk behavior was 
analyzed separately, is described in more detail elsewhere 
(14). Brief details of the sample and questionnaire are giv-
en below.
Sample
From September 20 through November 22, 2005, in-
terviews were conducted in native languages by native 
speakers of each region, who used computer-assisted tele-
phone interviewing and random-digit dialing. Unanswered 
numbers were tried again as many as 5 times; when pos-
sible, call-back appointments were made. Persons 18–75 
years of age were eligible for participation, and the member 
of the household with the most recent birthday was invited 
to participate.
Questionnaire
The questionnaire was based on a SARS and infl u-
enza risk perception questionnaire (14). The full question-
naire is available from www2.eur.nl/fgg/mgz/sarscontrol/
questionnaire_risk_perceptions_survey.htm, and a copy of 
our questionnaire is available on request.
The questionnaire was translated into local languages 
and back translated to check the accuracy of these transla-
tions. Basic demographic and socioeconomic information 
about age, sex, education, health, and employment status 
and the like was sought. Respondents were asked to rate 
how serious they thought it would be to contract a range 
of illnesses including a heart attack, common cold, a new 
strain of infl uenza, and SARS, and how likely they them-
selves and the average person would be to contract these 
diseases in the following year. They were asked a number 
of questions to ascertain their level of knowledge of SARS 
and infl uenza, where they had obtained information on 
these diseases, and how trustworthy they perceived these 
information sources to be. 
Respondents were then asked to imagine that a global 
infl uenza epidemic had reached their country. They were 
given a list of 6 places (public transportation; entertainment 
places such as cinemas, restaurants and theaters; shops; 
work or school; hospital; or home) and asked in which of 
these they thought they would run the greatest risk for in-
fection. They were then randomly given 1 of 2 scenarios: a 
high-risk scenario in which over a 5-week period, 10% of 
their fellow inhabitants of all ages would be seriously ill 
with infl uenza and 0.1% would have died of the disease; 
and a low-risk scenario in which these rates were 2.5% and 
0.025%, respectively. These scenarios were presented to 
the respondents in terms of rounded numbers of cases and 
deaths, scaled to their jurisdictions’ population size (rather 
than rates). Respondents were next given the following 
list of 8 precautionary behavior modifi cations and asked 
whether they would adopt any of them: avoid public trans-
portation (e.g., trains, buses, airplanes); avoid going out 
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for entertainment (e.g., bars, restaurants, theaters, cinema); 
limit shopping to the essentials; take leave from work; keep 
children out of school, even if school remains open (only 
adults with children were asked this question); limit physi-
cal contact with friends and family; avoid seeing doctors, 
even when sick from something unrelated to fl u; and stay 
indoors at all times.
To prevent their forgetting the earlier settings on the 
list and to limit the interview to a maximum of 15 min-
utes, respondents were not given the full lists of the riskiest 
places and precautionary actions mentioned above. Instead, 
3 places were randomly selected from the list of 6 possible 
places, and 3 precautionary actions were selected from the 
8 possible. Additionally, the 3 places and the 3 precaution-
ary actions were presented in random order. The main limi-
tation of this sampling method is that it effectively reduces 
our sample size, but we expect sampling bias to be minimal 
because options (risky places and precautionary actions) 
were allocated randomly.
Analysis
The analysis was performed by using STATA soft-
ware version 8 (StataCorp LP, College Station, TX, USA). 
Simple t test was used to compare the differences in means 
(or proportions) between the 2 broad sources of samples 
(Europe and Asia) in terms of riskiest place and adopting 
precautionary behavior. Probit regression was used to as-
sess the effect of individual- and regional-level covariates 
on each reported precautionary action. The main outcome 
variable was whether respondents reported that they would 
avoid the places presented to them. For 8 different speci-
fi cations, the explanatory variables remain the same and 
only the outcome of interest (the probability of taking the 
preventive action) varied. We did not adjust for multiple 
comparisons, which should be considered when interpret-
ing these results.
For the regression analysis, we controlled for respon-
dents’ age, sex, region of residence, educational history, 
and perceived risk for infl uenza. Our measure of perceived 
risk was based on protection motivation theory (15), which 
proposes that the intention to protect oneself depends on 
4 factors: 1) perceived severity of a threatened event, 2) 
perceived probability of the occurrence (vulnerability), 3) 
perceived effi cacy of the recommended preventive behav-
ior (perceived response effi cacy), and 4) perceived self-
effi cacy (level of confi dence in one’s ability to undertake 
the recommended preventive behavior). Risk perception 
(beliefs about potential harm) has many dimensions, but in 
keeping with nearly all theories, we focused on only 2 (12): 
1) likelihood and 2) severity of harm if no action is taken. 
We also examined the added effect of response effi ca-
cy and self-effi cacy on precautionary actions. To measure 
persons’ perceived probability of harm/infection (vulner-
ability) we asked respondents, “How likely do you think 
it is that you will develop or contract fl u from a new fl u 
virus in the case of global fl u outbreak?” For severity, we 
asked, “How serious would it be for you to get the disease 
in the next year?” In line with protection motivation theory 
(14,15), risk perception was constructed by multiplication 
of severity (scale of 1 to 10) and vulnerability (scale of 1 
to 5) scores. To make the severity and likelihood scores 
comparable, the severity score was fi rst divided by 2. To 
normalize the skewed distribution of the constructed risk 
perception variable, a square-root transformation was per-
formed, which resulted in a measure of risk perception on a 
scale from 1 (low) to 5 (high) (14).
Results
Respondents
Of the eligible persons who were contacted by phone, 
42% completed the interview and the rest refused to par-
ticipate, which resulted in a sample size of 3,436. The co-
operation rate varied between 21% in the United Kingdom 
and 81% in Poland (14). Unadjusted summary statistics 
and description of the key variables of interest are given in 
Table 1. The number of respondents in each participating 
region ranged from 401 to 502 (Table 2). Table 1 shows 
that respondents from European countries had a higher per-
ceived risk for infl uenza, lower perceived risk for SARS, 
and in general were older than respondents from Asia. 
Compared with Asians, relatively more Europeans had a 
secondary education, fewer had a university education, and 
substantially fewer lived in urban areas.
Riskiest Place
Public transportation was identifi ed as the riskiest 
place by >54% of persons who were given this option (43% 
in Singapore to 63% in Spain; Table 2) and by respondents 
from 6 of the 8 regions. Places of entertainment were gen-
erally ranked as the next most risky setting (in China and 
Singapore the ranking of public transportation and enter-
tainment was reversed), followed by hospitals, shops, then 
work or school (Figure 1). Respondents from all regions 
reported the home to be the least risky setting (Table 2, 
Figure 1).
Precautionary Behavior
Avoidance of public transportation was consistently 
reported across the region as the most likely precautionary 
behavior. From 65% (in Singapore) to 85% (in Great Brit-
ain) of respondents reported that they would avoid public 
transportation. Similar proportions of European respondents 
reported that they would avoid places of entertainment, al-
though a far smaller proportion of Asian respondents said 
that they would (Figure 2), despite Asians being more like-
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ly to report this setting as risky (Figure 1). Approximately 
60% of respondents said that they would shop for essentials 
only, and ≈50% said that they would take leave from work, 
prevent their children from attending school, or limit con-
tact with friends and family. Approximately 25% of Euro-
pean and 35% of Asian respondents said that they would 
try to stay indoors or avoid seeing physicians (Figure 2). 
Univariate analysis results suggested a statistically signifi -
cant difference between regions in terms of proportions of 
persons who would adopt precautionary actions in case of a 
hypothetical infl uenza outbreak (Table 3).
Multivariate regression was used to test the association 
between the likelihood of reporting precautionary actions 
and individual-, country-, and regional-level characteristics 
(Table 4). The coeffi cients in Table 4 refl ect marginal ef-
fects, which can be interpreted as probabilities. For example, 
the coeffi cient attached to the European region in the fi rst 
regression equation (avoiding public transportation) was 
0.038, which can be interpreted as Europeans being 3.8% 
more likely than Asians to avoid public transportation.
In general, individual characteristics such as age, sex, 
self-reported infl uenza vaccination, and health status had 
little effect on reported precautionary measures (although 
younger persons were less likely to avoid places of enter-
tainment and more likely to take leave from work). Even 
persons’ perceived risk for infl uenza had little effect except 
for avoiding public transportation; more respondents with 
higher risk perceptions reported being likely to avoid this 
setting (Table 4). The only individual-level variable that 
appeared to affect many of the precautionary actions was 
employment status. Fewer employed respondents reported 
being likely to avoid public transportation, entertainment 
venues, and work, and less likely to stay at home than 
those not employed full-time (e.g., homemakers, retirees, 
students). Although employed respondents were less likely 
(or perhaps less able) to adopt precautionary measures for 
themselves, they were more likely than persons who were 
not employed to report that they would withdraw their chil-
dren from school (Table 4). The other notable individual-
level covariate was education. In general, more respon-
dents with higher educational levels reported being likely 
to avoid entertainment and shopping than did those with 
lower educational levels. Those with higher educational 
levels were generally less likely to report that they would 
take precautionary measures in other settings, but the ef-
fects were not statistically signifi cant (Table 4).
The risk scenario given to the respondents (high vs. 
lower illness and death rates) did not signifi cantly affect 
1310 Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 13, No. 9, September 2007
Table 1. Variables measured in survey of risk perception for pandemic influenza, Europe and Asia*
Mean score (SD) 
Variable Definition
Respondents from 
Europe (n = 2,196)
Respondents from 
Asia (n = 1,240)
SARS risk perception Risk perception score (1–5) 2.47 (0.95) 2.95 (1.13)
Influenza risk perception Risk perception score (1–5) 2.95 (1.01) 2.83 (1.05)
Influenza severity Perceived severity of influenza (1–10) 6.94 (2.55) 6.56 (2.69)
Influenza vulnerability Perceived vulnerability to influenza infection (1–5) 2.81 (1.17) 2.75 (1.24)
Sex 1 if female 0.40 (0.49) 0.45 (0.50)
Age Age in years 47.46 (14.32) 39.13 (15.03)
Education medium 1 if respondent has more than a secondary but at 
least a higher secondary education
0.59 (0.49) 0.51 (0.50)
Education high 1 if respondent has university qualification 0.30 (0.46) 0.42 (0.49)
Urban area 1 if respondent’s area of residence is city/town 0.61 (0.49) 0.96 (0.20)
European region 1 if respondent is from European region NA NA
High-risk scenario 1 if given outbreak scenario is high risk 0.50 (0.50) 0.66 (0.47)
Health Health status on 1–6 Likert scale 4.28 (1.10) 4.25 (1.08)
Vaccinated 1 if vaccinated against influenza in past year 0.19 (0.39) 0.22 (0.41)
Employed 1 if employed 0.60 (0.49) 0.60 (0.49)
*NA, not available. 
Table 2. Perceived risk of setting during influenza pandemic, Europe and Asia* 
Location Sample size Most risky† Least risky† 
Guangdong, PRC 409 Entertainment (56) Home (0) 
Hong Kong, SAR, PRC 401 Public transportation (52) Home (2) 
Singapore 430 Entertainment (48) Home (12) 
Spain 427 Public transportation (63) Home (3) 
Poland 502 Public transportation (60) Home (1) 
Denmark 463 Public transportation (58) Home (4) 
Great Britain 401 Public transportation (49) Home (4) 
The Netherlands 403 Public transportation (48) Home (5) 
*PRC, People’s Republic of China; SAR, Special Administrative Region. 
†Numbers in parentheses indicate percentage of respondents who were given this option.  
Response to Threat of Pandemic Infl uenza
the results (Table 4). Region, however, did affect many of 
the reported precautionary actions. For example, Europe-
ans were 19% more likely than Asians to report that they 
would keep their children from school, whereas Europeans 
were 13% less likely to report that they would avoid seeing 
physicians (Table 4). Respondents who lived in urban areas 
were less likely than their rural counterparts to report that 
they would avoid entertainment venues and restrict their 
shopping to the essentials, although the differences were 
not large (Table 4).
Discussion
As a part of a large population-based survey of per-
ceptions of pandemic infl uenza risk, we studied preventive 
behavior in 8 regions. Conducting comparable surveys in a 
number of different countries (3 of which had large SARS 
outbreaks in 2003) made it possible to make intercountry 
comparisons and assess underlying factors that may lead to 
precautionary actions. Our results suggest that large num-
bers of persons would try to take precautionary measures to 
reduce their risk of acquiring pandemic infl uenza. Approxi-
mately 75% of respondents said that they would avoid pub-
lic transportation, and similar numbers would avoid places 
of entertainment and restrict their shopping to the essen-
tials. These reported actions are in agreement with those 
reported in similar hypothetical studies and recorded be-
havior in the face of an epidemic. A recent survey of public 
health professionals in the United States (16) indicated that 
almost half would avoid work, a proportion similar to that 
reported by the general public in our survey. A survey of 
the Chinese community in the Netherlands, conducted just 
after the SARS epidemic, indicated that 84% had avoided 
travel to SARS-affected areas and 50% had avoided large 
gatherings of people (unpub. data), results that are com-
parable to those reported here. Furthermore, data on the 
use of public transportation and entertainment facilities in 
SARS-affected regions (17) suggest that demand for these 
services is affected by the public’s perceived risk of ac-
quiring disease. The effect of such precautionary measures 
could be large in the case of pandemic infl uenza; the east 
and Southeast Asian economies lost an estimated $60 bil-
lion in the SARS outbreak because of reduced demand and 
business revenues (18).
Knowledge of what persons are likely to do can be 
used to estimate the health and economic effects of various 
pandemic infl uenza scenarios. We describe what propor-
tion will take precautionary actions as well as the socioeco-
nomic background of these persons, which would be useful 
for improving communication efforts by public health of-
fi cials and clinicians in response to an outbreak.
One of the strengths of our study was its multicoun-
try approach; with few exceptions, the patterns of potential 
precautionary actions were similar among respondents in 
each region. Public transportation was generally regarded 
as the most risky place and most likely to be avoided; home 
was regarded as the least risky setting. Individual-level 
characteristics such as age, sex, health, and educational 
status played little role in reported precautionary actions. 
Some regional differences were noted; Asian respondents 
reported that they were less likely to avoid restaurants 
and other entertainment establishments and more likely to 
avoid visiting physicians (the latter may have been related 
to their increased awareness of SARS [Table 3], which was 
often acquired in a healthcare setting). The identifi cation 
of shops and hospitals as risky places had the largest varia-
tion between countries in Europe but the smallest variation 
between regions in Asia (Figure 1). The dominant pattern, 
however, was broadly similar across sociodemographic, 
health, and geographic strata.
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Figure 1. Proportion of respondents who reported each setting as 
the riskiest for acquiring pandemic infl uenza, by region. Vertical 
lines indicate range of means for each region.
Figure 2.  Proportion of respondents 
who reported that they would take 
precautionary actions, by region. 
Vertical lines indicate range of 
means for each region.
RESEARCH
The multivariate analysis provides some useful in-
sights. Employment has emerged as an important deter-
minant of prospective precautionary actions; employed 
persons were less likely to report that they would take pre-
ventive actions.
Our measure of risk perception (combining severity 
and vulnerability) was not associated with precautionary 
actions (except avoiding public transportation), and the 
measures of severity and vulnerability, separately, did not 
indicate any statistically signifi cant infl uence. Thus, nei-
ther the risk perception score nor its individual components 
seemed to affect preventative actions, apart from the likeli-
hood of avoiding public transportation. Liu et al. (19) found 
different components of risk perception to be signifi cant in 
different geographic areas. In the Netherlands, higher risk 
perception was associated with more self-reported precau-
tionary actions for SARS; however, when other explana-
tory variables like age, sex, education were included, no 
signifi cant association between risk perception and precau-
tionary actions was observed (20). If risk perceptions re-
ally do have little effect on precautionary behavior, public 
health messages aimed at changing persons’ perceptions of 
risk might be ineffective at changing their behavior. Clear-
ly, this area requires further empirical study.
The main drawback of this type of survey is the dif-
fi culty in validating results. First, the participation rate 
varied 21%–81% among regions. Although a low response 
brings into question the representativeness of the samples, 
the similarity in fi ndings between regions suggests that 
the low participation rate in some regions did not bias the 
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Table 3. Perception of risk for hypothetical pandemic influenza, Europe and Asia
Variable Sample size* Europe, % (SD) Asia, % (SD)
H0: proportions (E) – 
proportions (A) = 0†
Riskiest place 
 Public transportation 1,700 56 (0.50) 50 (0.50) 0.0234
 Entertainment 1,793 43 (0.50) 52 (0.50) 0.0004
 Shop 1,702 30 (0.46) 28 (0.45) 0.4340
 Work/school 1,668 27 (0.45) 23 (0.42) 0.0444
 Hospital 1,749 41 (0.49) 39 (0.49) 0.4025
 Family 1,696 3.4 (0.18) 5 (0.22) 0.1190
Precautionary behavior
 Avoid public transportation 1,341 79 (0.41) 74 (0.44) 0.0418
 Avoid entertainment 1,263 79 (0.41) 33 (0.47) 0.0000
 Limit shopping to essentials 1,355 69 (0.46) 59 (0.49) 0.0002
 Be absent from work 1,307 35 (0.48) 52 (0.50) 0.0000
 Keep children from school 349‡ 59 (0.49) 39 (0.49) 0.0002
 Limit contact with friends/family 1,293 45 (0.50) 52 (0.50) 0.0100
 Avoid seeing doctors 1,310 22 (0.42) 34 (0.47) 0.0000
 Stay indoors 1,316 24 (0.43) 35 (0.48) 0.0000
*Sample size represents the number of persons randomly chosen to answer each option. 
†H0, null hypothesis that difference between European (E) and Asian (A) proportions is not statistically significant. Significant differences using p value of t
test. 
‡This question was asked of only the 349 respondents who had a child going to school. 
Table 4. Results of regression analysis (marginal effects) of precautionary behavior for hypothetical influenza pandemic, Europe and 
Asia
Variable
Avoid public 
transportation
Avoid
entertainment
Limit
shopping
Take 
absence
from work
Keep
children 
from
school
Limit contact 
with family/ 
friends
Avoid
seeing
doctor
Stay 
indoors
Sex (male) 0.005 –0.048 –0.054* 0.042 0.017 –0.021 –0.018 0.013
Age –0.001 0.003* 0.001 –0.003* –0.004 0.001 –0.001 0.001
Education medium 0.039 0.113* 0.175 –0.023 –0.223* –0.015 –0.015 –0.033
Education high 0.033 0.139* 0.185* –0.030 –0.189 0.010 –0.036 –0.055
Urban area –0.044 –0.071* –0.108* 0.004 –0.064 0.015 –0.061 0.009
European region 0.038 0.422* 0.072* –0.139* 0.186* –0.077* –0.130* –0.120*
High-risk scenario 0.000 0.018 0.056* 0.036 –0.056 –0.013 0.040 0.002
Risk for influenza 0.025* 0.004 0.012 0.009 –0.051 0.001 –0.006 0.014
Health 0.017 –0.009 –0.008 –0.013 –0.071* –0.009 0.016 –0.011
Vaccinated 0.019 0.011 0.041 0.025 0.045 0.002 0.003 0.022
Employed –0.051* –0.059 –0.081* –0.070* 0.053 –0.059 –0.033 –0.113*
Observation 1,341 1,263 1,355 1,307 349 1,293 1,310 1,316
Log likelihood –710.699 –687.188 –843.241 –863.953 –226.204 –887.342 –744.488 –747.710
*Significant at 0.05. 
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fi ndings. Second, because of the hypothetical nature of the 
questionnaire, concluding that persons actually would re-
spond in the way that they have indicated here is not pos-
sible; however, the fact that a large section of the Dutch 
Chinese population did report taking precautionary actions 
to avoid SARS lends support to our fi ndings (unpub. data).
Although the quantitative nature of the results may be 
diffi cult to validate, the qualitative fi ndings are likely to be 
more robust. A new infl uenza pandemic would most likely 
result in persons’ limiting their use of public transporta-
tion, entertainment, and shopping for nonessentials. Also, 
although the public may perceive the risk from healthcare 
facilities to be relatively high, they would not necessarily 
avoid them.
This work was conducted as part of “SARS Control: Effec-
tive and Acceptable Strategies for the Control of SARS and New 
Emerging Infections in China and Europe,” a European Commis-
sion project funded within the Sixth Framework Program, The-
matic Priority Scientifi c Support to Policies, Contract number 
SP22-CT-2004-003824. 
Mr Sadique is a graduate student at City University and a 
health economist at the Health Protection Agency, London. His 
research interests include analysis of demand for vaccination, 
economic evaluation of vaccination, and applied microeconomic 
issues related to healthcare demand.
References
  1.  Bell DM. Public health interventions and SARS spread, 2003. Emerg 
Infect Dis. 2004;10:1900–6.
  2.  Abdullah AS, Thomas GN, McGhee SM, Morisky DE. Impact of 
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) on travel and population 
mobility: implications for travel medicine practitioners. J Travel 
Med. 2004;11:107–11.
  3.  Fan X. SARS: economic impacts and implications. Policy Brief 15. 
Hong Kong: Asian Development Bank Economics and Research 
Department; 2003.
  4.  Lee J, McKibbin WJ. Globalization and disease: the case of SARS. 
Asian Economic Papers. 2004;3:113–31. [cited 2007 June 25]. 
Available from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/loi/asep 
  5.  Smith RD, Sommers T. Assessing the economic impact of public 
health emergencies of international concern: the case of SARS. Ge-
neva: World Health Organization; 2003.
  6.  Smith RD. Responding to global infectious disease outbreaks: les-
sons from SARS on the role of risk perception, communication and 
management. Soc Sci Med. 2006;63:3113–23.
  7.  World Health Organization. Cumulative number of confi rmed hu-
man cases of avian infl uenza A/(H5N1) reported to WHO. Epidemic 
and pandemic alert and response (EPR). [cited 2007 May 17]. Avail-
able from http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_infl uenza/country/
cases_table_2007_05_16/en/index.html
  8.  Blendon RJ, Benson JM, DesRoches CM, Raleigh E, Taylor-Clark 
K. The public’s response to severe acute respiratory syndrome in 
Toronto and the United States. Clin Infect Dis. 2004;38:925–31.
  9.  Smith RD, Drager N, Hardimann M, eds. The rapid assessment of 
the economic impact of public health emergencies of international 
concern: lessons from SARS. Oxford (UK): Oxford; 2006.
10.  Weinstein ND, Nicolich M. Correct and incorrect interpretations 
of correlations between risk perceptions and risk behaviors. Health 
Psychol. 1993;12:235–45.
11.  Brewer NT, Weinstein ND, Cuite CL, Herrington JE. Risk per-
ceptions and their relation to risk behavior. Ann Behav Med. 
2004;27:125–30.
12.  Brewer NT, Chapman GB, Gibbons FX, Gerrard M, McCaul KD, 
Weinstein ND. Meta-analysis of the relationship between risk per-
ception and health behavior: the example of vaccination. Health 
Psychol. 2007;26:136–45.
13.  Lupton D. Risk. London: Routledge; 1999.
14.  de Zwart O, Veldhuijzen IK, Elam G, Aro AR, Abraham T, Bish-
op GD, et al. Avian infl uenza risk perception, Europe and Asia. 
Emerg Infect Dis. 2007;13:290–3. Erratum in: Emerg Infect Dis 
2007;13:522. 
15.  Boer H, Seydel ER. Protection motivation theory. In: Connor M, 
Norman P, editors. Predicting health behavior. Buckingham (UK): 
Open University Press; 1996.
16.  Balicer RD, Omer SB, Barnett DJ, Everly GS Jr. Local public health 
workers’ perceptions toward responding to an infl uenza pandemic. 
BMC Public Health. 2006;6:99.
17.  Abdullah AS, Thomas GN, McGhee SM, Morisky DE. Impact of 
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) on travel and population 
mobility: implications for travel medicine practitioners. J Travel 
Med. 2004;11:107–11.
18.  Asian Development Bank. Assessing the impact and cost of SARS in 
developing Asia. Hong Kong: Asia Development Outlook; 2003:75–
92.
19.  Liu JT, Hammitt JK, Wang JD, Tsou MW. Valuation of the risk of 
SARS in Taiwan. Health Econ. 2005;14:83–91.
20.  Brug J, Aro AR, Oenema A, de Zwart O, Richardus JH, Bishop GD. 
SARS risk perception, knowledge, precautions, and information 
sources, the Netherlands. Emerg Infect Dis. 2004;10:1486–9.
Address for correspondence: M. Zia Sadique, Statistics, Modelling and 
Bioinformatics Department, Health Protection Agency, 61 Colindale Ave, 
London NW9 5EQ, UK; email: zia.sadique@hpa.org.uk
 Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 13, No. 9, September 2007 1313 
Search past issues of EID at www.cdc.gov/eid
